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Abstract
Although pension funds have gained importance in the last two decades, their
role has not been described in detail by economic models. This paper focusses
on the scope of these institutional investors when they are not satisﬁed with
a management team of a company in which the pension fund holds a block of
shares. Stock holdings by pension funds are largely dispersed. Therefore, any
intervention by pension funds in corporate governance requires the formation
of a coalition of pension funds. The realization of a coordinated intervention, in
turn, is subject to the problems related to the provision of public goods, such
as free-riding. We ﬁnd that stock dispersion among pension funds, the amount
of noise traders, coordination costs and the attractiveness of the exit option
are relevant factors for successful interventions. The overall probability for a
successful intervention, however, is quite low.
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Since the onset of the modern corporation with its separation of ownership
and control, classical economists have focussed on the problems of aligning
the interests of the “principal” (investors) and the “main agent” (company
managers). Berle and Means were already concerned in 1932 that the dispersion
of share ownership in large corporations could open up numerous possibilities
for managers to pursue their own goals (low and insuﬃcient eﬀort, ineﬃcient or
extravagant investments, entrenchment strategies or self dealing actions), to the
detriment of shareholders. In the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929,
many rules and regulations (e.g. disclosure requirements, insider trading rules)
were implemented, to protect small investors. Due to this New Deal legislation,
stock markets became safer and therefore more liquid; but it had the side eﬀect
of discouraging concentrated active stockholding (Bhide, 1993).
The defense of shareholders’ interests against dysfunctional behaviour of
managers has always been at the core of corporate governance theory. A wide
body of literature focusses on the question of how to implement eﬃcient in-
centive systems and monitoring structures. One way to overcome the classical
principal/agent problem with regard to incorporated companies is to align the
interests of management with those of stockholders through specially devised
incentives in work contracts. A potential corrective measure to discipline an un-
satisfactory management team exists in the market for corporate control. When
the management of a public company with dispersed ownership lacks suﬃcient
motivation or capabilities and is very poorly supervised, raiders could take over
such a poorly performing ﬁrm. But as Grossman/Hart showed in their semi-
nal paper in 1980, the market for corporate control can not be fully eﬃcient,
since such a raid is costly and atomistic investors will free-ride on the actions
of the raider, i.e. not tender the shares, in order to enjoy the improvement in
the ﬁrm. Partial solutions to overcome the free-rider problem may consist in a
corporate charter, which encourages takeover bids (Grossman/Hart, 1980), the
original existence of a large “toehold” (Shleifer/Vishny, 1986) or the possibility
of “tunneling” (Johnson et.al, 2000).
As Bagnoli/Lipman in 1988 and Holmstr¨ om/Nalebuﬀ in 1992 pointed out,
the problem of free-riding is only serious in models which assume atomistic
stockholders. In cases in which each stockholder possesses not only one, but
many stocks and where the number of stockholders is ﬁnite, tender oﬀers for a
majority of stocks have a positive chance of being successful, since shareholders
have an incentive to tender a portion of their shares and keep another portion,
from which they can proﬁt in case of a successful takeover. In this regard, the
potential increase in ﬁrm value can be viewed as a public good from which all
stockholders partially proﬁt.
As Olson showed in 1965, the free-rider problem becomes more severe, the
higher the number of private parties necessary for the production of the public
good. And the bigger the free-rider problem, the less likely it is that the public
good will be produced by private parties, which have to voluntarily form a coali-
tion. Palfrey/Rosenthal in 1984 ﬁrst presented a formal model for calculating
the probability of the production of the public good. Dixit/Olson in 2000 use a
1similar model, but they assume that total contribution costs are ﬁxed, whereas
Palfrey/Rosenthal assume that the contribution of each participant is constant,
independent of the number of cooperative parties. In our paper we also use the
Palfrey/Rosenthal approach, but we assume that total contribution costs rise
with the number of participants. The assumption of rising costs in our model is
very plausible, since coordination of opinions and actions is more complex and
costly the higher the number of parties involved.
In contrast to the vast literature on raiders and other blockholders, as far
as we know the role of pension funds has not been investigated in theoretical
models yet. One reason could be that pension funds invest in a very diversiﬁed
manner and therefore very seldom appear in the public or media. Pension funds
cannot act as raiders, taking over ﬁrms, both for legal reasons and because such
an action does not fall within their purpose. Another reason is that, because
of diversiﬁcation, even a sizeable pension fund holds only a minor stake of a
few percent in any one speciﬁc ﬁrm. CalPERS for example, the large and
active California public pension fund, holds about 1400 diﬀerent stocks and
owns “between 0.5 and 2 percent of the outstanding stock for each company in
its portfolio” (Hawley and Williams, 2000). Risk considerations lead such huge
pension funds to be prone to liquid stocks, which usually also induces them to
undertake only small or no monitoring eﬀorts at all. If a stock position seems
doubtful, an individual pension fund therefore will rather sell its stake than
undertake the costly eﬀorts of monitoring and intervening. But even selling a
stake of the size of 0.5 to 2 percent will most likely have a negative impact on
the stock price. This argument applies even more if all pensions funds want to
sell the same stock at the same time.
This individualistic behaviour has to be viewed diﬀerently if we consider that
nowadays pension funds as a group own a sizeable portion of the stock market.
If some or all pension funds wanted to unload a displeasing stock position at the
same time, the induced price drop aﬀects not only the selling funds - through
both in sold and unsold stocks - but also all other inactive pension funds. But
taken as a group, pension funds could produce a public good by intervening
in a coordinated way. This potential for pension funds has been recognised
especially in the USA, where institutional investors have long replaced private
investors. Hawley and Williams pointed out in 1980 already that institutional
investors, whom they name “universal owners” (since they own all stocks), could
potentially play a prominent role with regard not only to corporate governance
questions, but also with regard to environmental problems. Tirole (2001) also
questions if and how institutional investors such as pension funds should be
active monitors and interfere if necessary with management.1 Critical views
claim that pension funds would not be speciﬁcally qualiﬁed to take on the role
of monitoring ﬁrms operating in diﬀerent industrial environments, and therefore
should concentrate only on their role as ﬁduciaries for their clientele of active
contributors and retirees.
1According to Tirole, institutional investors in the US mainly act as short-term stock
market players, responsible for 80 percent of trading volume, with an average holding period
of stocks of only 1.9 years. On the other hand, they are only rarely represented on the board.
2There exist some empirical papers which focus on the role of pension funds.
Smith (1996) investigated the approach and success of CalPERS (California
Public Employees Retirement System), the largest public pension fund in the
United States and very prominent due to its monitoring of companies. Between
1987/1988, CalPERS focussed on ﬁrms which had a bad governance structure
(e.g. presence of “poison pills” etc.). From 1988 to 1993 CalPERS targeted large
ﬁrms with a high percentage of institutional investors and whose stocks had an
unsatisfactory stock performance. A short list of such ﬁrms was more closely
investigated and CalPERS wrote a shareholder resolution with recommenda-
tions concerning changing the board of directors and executive compensation,
which was discussed with the management of the company. If the management
agreed to the changes, the resolution was withdrawn; otherwise, it was brought
to vote at the general assembly. Empirically, Smith found mixed results; stocks
of ﬁrms that agreed had an abnormal positive return of +1 percent, while stocks
of resisting ﬁrms had an average negative return of -1 percent. Also, operat-
ing proﬁts of targeted ﬁrms did not improve after intervention by CalPERS.
Activism for the portfolio of CalPERS though showed positive results. While
monitoring costs amounted to about half a million dollars per year, the increase
in value of its holdings amounted to 19 Mio USD. After reviewing a wide set of
empirical studies with regard to the eﬀectiveness of pension funds’ monitoring,
Prevost and Rao (2000) conclude that results are mixed. No positive eﬀect
could be proven for both the operating performance and the stock performance
of targeted ﬁrms. Prevost and Rao test the hypothesis that the primary func-
tion of a proposal of a pension fund is to act as a signaling mechanism in alerting
the market that the targeted management is unwilling to negotiate a settlement
with the pension fund. Prevost and Rao ﬁnd in their event study that ﬁrms
experienced negative wealth eﬀects when targeted either by CalPERS, or by a
coalition of public funds supporting one or more proposals on the same proxy.
Firms which were targeted several times by public pension funds experienced
permanent declines in market value. Some empirical studies focus not on per-
formance data of shares of targeted ﬁrms, but on direct eﬀects of monitoring.
Faccio and Lasfer (2000) analyse the monitoring role of occupational pension
funds in the UK, and conclude that these funds are not eﬀective monitors. Del
Guercio and Hawkins (1999) study shareholder proposals of the largest, most
active funds in the USA up to 1993 and ﬁnd that shareholder proposals are fol-
lowed by signiﬁcant corporate governance activity and wide corporate changes
such as asset sales and restructurings. Crespi-Cladera and Renneboog (2000)
investigate voting coalitions which aim at disciplining incumbent management.
They ﬁnd that Shapley values capturing the relative power of shareholder coali-
tions outperform models with percentage ownership stakes.
In this paper, we investigate under which conditions a group of homogenous
pension funds has a chance at forming a coalition to exert pressure on the in-
cumbent management team.2 These huge pension funds hold widely diversiﬁed
2Incumbent management does not necessarily have to be incompetent or corrupt, but may
simply be stubborn. As Jensen (1988) describes, “managers often have troubles abandoning
strategies, they have spent years designing and implementing, even when these strategies no
longer contribute to the organizations survival”, p.23.
3portfolios and can never act as raiders for ﬁduciary reasons. Their position in
a single ﬁrm, albeit big from the point of view of a small shareholder, is nev-
ertheless too small to pursue costly monitoring and intervening singlehandedly.
Therefore, monitoring and intervention can only be undertaken by forming
a coalition with other pension funds. Our one-period model of forming the
coalition is similar to Palfrey/ Rosenthal (1984) or Dixit/Olson (2000), but in
contrast to these authors we do not assume ﬁxed or even declining contribution
costs per participant, but rather rising contribution costs. This reduces the
probability of a successful coalition outcome, but describes costs of coalition
procedures more precisely. Additionally, we formalise the alternative option
each pension fund has of unloading part or all of its stockholding if it is not
content with a particular ﬁrm. Whether that option is economically feasible
mainly depends upon transaction costs and the rate of reinvestment return.
The paper is organised as follows: in the next section, we examine under
which circumstances a coordinated eﬀort of pension funds has a chance of being
successful. It will be shown that the formation of a winning coalition will be
more likely when pension funds have a higher concentration of stocks of the
targeted company. In the second subsection we investigate the case of pension
funds using the “exit” option by selling the speciﬁc stock. Depending upon the
size of the “market impact”, e.g. the price decline of the sold stock, the ﬁnancial
result of both courses of action can be compared. In section 3 we discuss the
results of the preceding two subsections in the context of current thinking on
corporate governance issues and propose further research opportunities. In the
concluding section we show possible implications for pension funds and policy
makers.
2 Model for coalition building
Due to portfolio considerations, stock holdings by pension funds are largely
dispersed. Therefore, it cannot be expected that any intervention by pension
funds in corporate governance will be accomplishable without the pension funds
forming a coalition. As we will argue below, the realization of a coordinated
intervention is subject to several characteristics strongly linked to the problems
known from public good provision such as free-riding. Essentially, free-riding
may result in a failure of the Coase Theorem as participation in the coalition
is voluntary. This is precisely the reason that pension funds may not engage in
shareholder activism even though such action may result in a pareto-superior
outcome. Coase argued that given a government that allocates property rights
between parties and a court that enforces the agreed bargain, a precise alloca-
tion of property rights and the absence of any costs of information or negotiation
would lead to a bargaining solution between two parties that internalizes any
externalities between them. Moreover, Coase extended this argument to larger
groups so that in his idealized world of zero transaction costs, eﬃcient outcomes
can be achieved no matter how large the groups are. According to Dixit and
Olson (2000), Coase did not claim that he was oﬀering a theorem, contrary to
the economic literature based on Stigler (1971) who asserted that he did. A
4typical formulation of the Coase Theorem states that in the absence of transac-
tion costs, rational parties will necessarily achieve a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation
through voluntary transactions or bargaining. In reality however, transaction
costs do matter and must be taken into account in deﬁning a Pareto-eﬃcient
outcome. Dixit and Olson (2000) further argue that if the Coase Theorem ap-
plies, it must also be true that rational parties will conduct all those trades
in private goods - and all those bargainings which internalize externalities or
provide public goods - that yield positive net gains greater than the transaction
costs of realising them. Consequently, the Coase Theorem under transaction
costs implies a marginal condition according to which rational parties will nec-
essarily achieve a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation through voluntary transactions or
bargaining.
2.1 The Model - voice only
Olson (1965,1996) and Dixit and Olson (2000) among others have argued that
the Coase Theorem would lead in many cases to absurd conclusions as it does
not take into account the number of parties who must participate in the in-
ternalization of externalities or the provision of public goods. The result of
Pareto-ineﬃcient outcomes is therefore not only due to transaction costs which
would be covered by the modiﬁed Coase Theorem, but also to the existence
of free-rider incentives. The latter in turn are a function of population size,
N, and the minimum number of parties, M, necessary to produce a public
good. We follow this line of argument based on Dixit and Olson (2000) that
the Coasian claim that a ’meeting’ of all beneﬁciaries of the public good will
achieve unanimous agreement on the provision of that public good neglects the
non-cooperative incentive to free-ride on the coalition’s eﬀort. As stated above,
it is an inherent part of the Coase Theorem that participation and agreements
are voluntary. Only focussing on the ’meeting’ therefore overstates the power
of the Coase Theorem and leads to an overoptimistic view of the eﬃciency of
market outcomes.
We assume that the provision of a public good - the increase in the economic
performance of the ﬁrm under consideration - requires a minimum number of
pension funds M bearing its production costs, with M < N. Everyone is free ei-
ther to join the coalition of size M or to free-ride. If there is a suﬃcient number
of pension funds joining the coalition, so that the public good can be produced,
intervention takes place. Hence, each agent - each pension fund in our case - has
to formulate the probability of his participation in the coalition being pivotal
or not. Obviously, the probability of being pivotal depends on M relative to N.
If N is large compared to M the probability that one pension fund is pivotal is
small, hence, each pension fund may decide in a non-cooperative manner not to
join the coalition and to free-ride. This in turn means that intervention cannot
take place because of the wide dispersion of stocks in the respective enterprize
that are held by pension funds.
In the setting we present here, each pension fund is free to join the coalition or
not. Additionally, as far as the distribution of shares of the ﬁrm under consid-
5eration is concerned, we assume an equal distribution of shares held by pension
funds (i = 1,...,N), with αPF =
PN
i=1 αi < 1 representing the overall amount
of shares held by the N pension funds. The remaining shares 1−αPF are held
by noise traders. Moreover, we assume that the economic performance of the
ﬁrm under consideration is reﬂected by the shareholder value. Normalizing the
price per share to one, and assuming that the economic performance of the ﬁrm
remains at its current level with a successful intervention and is zero otherwise,
the beneﬁt of the coalition Π1 is equal to amount of shares held by each pension
fund.
If the number of pension funds within the coalition reaches the critical level
M, the intervention is successful, the costs CI of the intervention are shared
within the coalition and the expected increase in the economic performance of
the ﬁrm exhibits the characteristics of a non-excludable public good. Although
each pension fund is free in its decision to free-ride or to join the coalition,
it is known to everybody that there is no increase in shareholder value if the
coalition fails to form. Hence, the decision to free-ride is dependent upon the
probability of success that the coalition will form without the participation of
the pension fund willing to free-ride. Therefore, in order to decide whether to
join the coalition or not, each pension fund has to formulate a rational expecta-
tion of whether the coalition will be successful without its participation. There
are only two possible outcomes: success or failure. We denote by P (which is
endogenous) the probability of any pension fund i ∈ N joining the coalition.
At this point, we can denote the probability of exactly M successes in N in-





PM(1 − P)N−M. (1)
From the perspective of an individual pension fund, the rational decision
can be demonstrated as follows. If there are (M − 1) or more players out of
(N −1) players, then the expected net beneﬁt of joining the coalition (IN) from












On the other hand, if more than M of N −1 players choose IN, the (N −1)-
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6A mixed-strategy equilibrium requires indiﬀerence between joining the coali-
tion and free-riding hence equalizing the last two expressions yields
(N − 1)!
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cost of choosing IN
The term on the LHS in Eq.(4) means that M − 1 chose IN, hence N − 1 is
pivotal. The RHS is the cost share of the (N −1)-th player when he chooses IN.
In aggregate M players are necessary to form a coalition. P adjusts such





















An equilibrium implies that the shared costs among coalition members in re-
lation to the expected increase in shareholder value has to equal the conditional
probability at the margin that the coalition forms. Moreover, the cost-beneﬁt
relation on the right-hand side must be smaller than one (Π1 > CI
M ), to make
the formation of a coalition economically reasonable.
Figure 1 shows the cumulative probability that a coalition of size M will
form (dashed line) as a function of P for a given N which is, not surprisingly,
increasing in P. The solid line shows the behavior of the left-hand side in Eq.
(5) which is declining in P. Formally, the left-hand side can be interpreted
as a hazard rate which answers the question of how big the variation of the
probability is that there are more than M successes in N independent Bernoulli
trials, after an inﬁnitesimally small increase in P, given that the probability of
drawing more than M is 1−B(M|N,P). Obviously, the hazard rate is declining
from 1 to 0 as P increases from 0 to 1.3
The equilibrium probability of success is determined endogenously by Eq. (5)
depending on M, N, Π1 and CI. Since it is not possible to solve Eq. (5)
3For more details see appendix
7analytically, we have to apply a numerical iteration method by discretization
of the probability space.4












Bernoulli Trials with N = 6 and M = 2

















Figure 1: Determination of the endogenous probability, P (see Eq.(5)).
Solid line: hazard rate of M successes as a function of P for given N.
Dashed line: Cumulative probability that a coalition of size M will form as a
function of P for given N.
In Table 1, we present numerical solutions for the individual probability P of
joining the coalition and the cumulative probability, Q, that at least M pension
funds are willing to join the coalition. As previously mentioned, pension funds
hold large dispersed stocks varying between 0.5% and 2% in one ﬁrm. Therefore,
no pension fund is supposed to hold a very large stock position. Intervention
costs, CI, consist of two blocks: monitoring costs, CM, which are assumed to
be ﬁxed and which include the costs of collecting information about the ﬁrm
and controlling the management and the coordination costs among the group
of pension funds which choose to form a coalition, εM, with ε > 0. Therefore,
CI can be written as5
4A detailed description of the algorithm and an example for a MatLab-solution routine
is shown in the Appendix. Dixit and Olson (2000) yield numerical solutions through the
inversion of the incomplete β-function. Our method minimizes numerical eﬀort and is exact
up to 1 · 10
−9.
5We assume a linear cost function without further loss of generality. Convex cost functions
would just alter the quantitative results.
8CI = CM + εM (6)
With regard to the coordination costs, we assume quite an optimistic sce-
nario as the linearity in M suggests the collaboration among pension funds
which minimizes coordination eﬀort. Alternatively, we could assume that all
the pension funds willing to form a coalition have to coordinate themselves on
their own which would imply coordination costs of size εM2−M
2 . Hence, the
endogenous probabilities of coalition formation we derive below are upward bi-
ased. The qualitative results of the model, however, remain unaﬀected.
We normalize the price per share to one and, as before, the value of the ﬁrm is
supposed to be zero if the intervention fails and to remain on its previous level
if the intervention is successful.
Throughout the simulations 1a - 1c (see Table 1), we distinguish between two
critical levels of shares αcrit necessary for a successful intervention. The most
pessimistic value for αcrit is 0.5. According to empirical evidence, however, in
most cases it is not necessary to have a majority in order to win a proxy vote.
If the number of minority shareholders, for example noise traders is big, it may
well be that an αcrit of one third may be suﬃcient to win. As can be seen
in the baseline scenario (Table 1a) for an individual share per pension fund
αi = 0.55%, the minimum number of funds joining the coalition is 91 out of
100. An increase in the shares held by pension funds implies a lower M. A
lower M in turn decreases the probability that one single pension fund is pivotal
for the success of the coalition and therefore diminishes the willingness to bear
the costs of the intervention. Hence, the incentive to free-ride on the coalition’s
eﬀort is higher and the probability, P, for choosing to join the coalition (c.p.)
lower. At the same time, however, intervention costs are decreasing implying a
higher proﬁt-cost ratio of the coalition which makes participation in the coali-
tion more attractive and increases P. If a smaller coalition size also has lower
coordination costs and therefore a lower cost-beneﬁt ratio, the endogenous (in-
dividual) probability to join the coalition increases with the stock positions held
by pension funds. Since the cost-beneﬁt ratio is close to one and the minimum
number of pension funds necessary for a successful intervention, M, is quite
close to N, the cumulative probabilities, Q, for a successful formation of the
coalition are nearly zero.6
In Table 1b, we analyze the eﬀects of a lower αcrit, for example due to an
increase in the number of noise traders. Obviously, a lower αcrit reduces M
which increases the cost beneﬁt-ratio of the intervention. Both, the reduction
in M and the increase in CI
Π1M induce an increase in the incentive to free-ride
on the coalition’s eﬀort, hence, P and Q decline. An increase in the number
of shareholders who do not participate in a proxy vote reduces the chances for
6What is relevant for a successful formation of a coalition is the cumulative probability, Q,
of drawing at least M IN’s in N independent Bernoulli trials, which is determined by








The higher are M and N, the more the cumulative density function is shifted
to the right. Under such circumstances a cumulative probability for successful
coalition formation signiﬁcantly greater than zero can only be assured if the
cost-beneﬁt ratio is substantially smaller than one, for example due to a reduc-
tion in coordination costs. In Table 1c, we present the eﬀects of a substantial
reduction in coordination costs compared to the baseline scenario in Table 1a.
The reduction in the coordination costs leaves M unaﬀected. A lower cost-
beneﬁt ratio, however, increases the incentive for each pension fund to join the
coalition, hence P and Q are higher (see also Figures 2 and 3).
a) Baseline Scenario: N = 100; CM = 0.1; ε = 0.004; αcrit = 0.5
αi M CI
Π1M P Q
0.0055 91 0.9271 0.2930 1.5987 10−14
0.006 83 0.8675 0.3233 2.3759 10−14
0.0065 77 0.8152 0.3536 2.5424 10−14
b) Higher fraction of noise traders: αcrit = 0.45
αi M CI
Π1M P Q
0.0055 82 0.9490 0.1212 4.885 10−15
0.006 75 0.8889 0.1919 1.4766 10−14
0.0065 68 0.8289 0.2424 1.2768 10−14
c) Lower coordination costs: αcrit = 0.5; ε = 4 10−4
αi M CI
Π1M P Q
0.0055 91 0.2725 0.9092 0.5762
0.006 83 0.2675 0.8082 0.3425
0.0065 77 0.2613 0.7374 0.2694
Table 1: Endogenous probability P for choosing to join the coalition and the
cumulative Probability,Q, that at least M pension funds form a coalition.
Given the economic rationality of incentives to free-ride, we isolated three rea-
sons which may be responsible for the failure of an intervention. A wide stock
dispersion of pension funds reduces stock concentration in each ﬁrm which in-
creases coordination costs since more members are necessary to form a coalition.
High coordination costs lower the economic incentive to join the coalition and





























Figure 2: Graphical presentation of the Baseline Scenario (see Table 1a).


























Figure 3: Graphical presentation of the eﬀects of a reduction in the coordination
costs compared to the Baseline Scenario (see Table 1c).
11decrease the probability that one single pension fund is pivotal. Second, the
higher the amount of noise traders, the smaller is the minimum size of the
coalition, which again increases the individual incentive to free ride. Finally, a
cost-beneﬁt ratio close to one generates cumulative probabilities close to one.
Cumulative probabilities signiﬁcantly greater than zero can only be achieved
if the cost-beneﬁt ratio is much lower than one. Since monitoring costs are
generally ﬁxed, intervention costs could only be reduced by economizing on
coordination costs, for example in a more eﬃcient institutional setting such as
delegated votes.
2.2 Exit option
Pension funds, which do not participate in the coordinated eﬀort to improve a
speciﬁc ﬁrm have two possible choices: They can hold on to the shares of the
speciﬁc ﬁrm and thereby hope to free-ride on the actions of the coordinating
pension funds, or they can sell their shares in that speciﬁc ﬁrm in order to
reinvest the proceeds in the stock market. Because of the equilibrium condition
between participation in the coordinated eﬀort and free riding, these possibil-
ities yield ex ante the same return. This outcome has to be compared with
the situation where a speciﬁc pension fund uses an exit strategy and sells part
or all of its stock position, αi. We assume for the moment that the pension
fund holds a widely diversiﬁed portfolio and therefore does not have to consider
the risk impact of his decision to sell the speciﬁc stock. We further assume
that stocks of this speciﬁc ﬁrm only yield a return of 0, when no intervention
is undertaken, whereas the (opportunity) return of (re-)investing in the stock
market is ΠM. A pension fund will sell as many stocks as possible, as long as
the marginal return on the reinvestment exceeds transaction costs.
We assume that transaction costs induced by the sale consist of two diﬀerent
components. Obviously each trade involves a commission (payable to a broker
and to the stock exchange), which is a small proportional transaction cost rate
(k, k>0). Additionally, market impact has to be considered, especially in our
model where the selling pension fund (the only informed market participant
belonging to the group of pension funds) sells its holdings to uninformed small
or noise traders. When small investors recognize (by viewing the oﬀered vol-
ume) that the pension fund wants to unload its position in a speciﬁc stock, they
will suspect that the pension fund has superior information and so additional
stocks will only be bought at progressively lower prices7. Therefore market
impact costs m, (1 ≤ m ≤ 2 − k) increase steadily with trading size. The net
proceeds of selling a portion of that speciﬁc stock then amount to
sαi(1 − k − (ms − 1)) = sαi(2 − k − ms) (7)
7Since we only have one period of trading in our model, we assume that the pension fund
appears only once at the market and discloses the amount of shares it wants to sell. A more
detailed description of optimal trading and measuring of transaction costs is given in Grinold
and Kahn (1999). In order to minimize market impact, large investors typically spread the
trade over more periods while also having to consider opportunity costs.
12Market impact is highest when a pension fund wants to unload all its stocks
(s=1) and the liquidity of the market is extremely low (m = 2−k). In this case,
the stock price drops to zero. The pension fund will reinvest the net proceeds
in the stock market. We assume that the pension fund will use the proceeds
by investing proportionally in all the stocks of its portfolio in order to get the
average return of the stock market, ΠM. This buy trade only incurs brokerage
costs of k for the following two reasons: First, the buy tickets are smaller and
second, the counterparty does not suspect an information asymmetry, since the
volume of trades in this case is relatively small. It is now proﬁtable for the
pension fund to sell its shares of the “lemon” company and buy the market
portfolio as long as as the full trading costs, primarily the continuously rising
market impact costs on the sale side are still lower than the expected gain of
improving the portfolio. The return on the reinvestment, Γ is
Γ = ΠM(1 − k)sαi(2 − k − ms) (8)
It should be noted that this return on reinvestment represents ex ante, that is,
before the pension fund has taken its decisions, the opportunity costs of the
other two options of either joining the coordinated eﬀort or not doing anything
and free-riding. By taking the derivative of ΠM with respect to s in equation
(8), we derive the ﬁrst order conditions for an optimal fraction s, to be sold by
the pension fund
ΠM(1 − k)αi(2 − k − ms) − ΠM(1 − k)s2αims−1) = 0 (9)
By solving equation (9) for s, we get s∗, the optimal fraction of stocks to be
sold:
s∗ = (2 − k − m)1/2 (10)
The lower the market impact m, the more it is proﬁtable for the pension fund to
use the exit strategy and sell the number of shares given by equation (10). Only
the parameter k is directly observable, but direct transactions costs usually have
the least inﬂuence because of their minimal size. The size of the market impact
m will be determined by a number of factors: The higher αi, the fraction of the
ﬁrm in possession of the pension fund, and the lower the so-called “free ﬂoat”
- the shares which are held by the small investors - the bigger will be the price
drop when the pension fund starts to unload a part of its shares. Additionally,
if small investors or other market participants can ﬁnd out who the seller is and
if the pension fund has a good performance record in the eyes of the investing
public, the market impact will be bigger. Disclosure rules can force pension
13funds to declare their trading activities when they surpass certain thresholds,
so that the regulatory environment can also impact how pension funds (and
other large investors) act.
By the same rationality as described above we can derive the following equilib-
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For s∗ = 0 (no shares are sold, due to high transaction costs m), Eq. (12) is
equal to Eq. (5) without existence of an outside option. For s∗ > 0, a closer
inspection of Eqs. (11) reveals that the existence of an exit option increases
the return from free-riding on the coalition’s eﬀort (see RHS). Moreover, the
right-hand side of Eq. (12) is increasing in s∗ and ΠM. Since the left-hand side
is monotonically decreasing from one to zero, the existence of an outside option
lowers P and Q.
3 Coalition of “universal owners” and externalities
in proﬁts
One feature of pension funds has been omitted so far, because the one-period
model presented above cannot take time into account. But pension funds as
ﬁnancial intermediaries do have a long time horizon with regard to their lia-
bilities, i.e. future pensions for their members. Because of that, pension funds
should take into account intratemporal and intertemporal externalities when
they decide whether or not to closely monitor ﬁrms. Along this line of thought
Hawley and Williams (2000) introduce a “universal owner” and deﬁne him as
following: “A universal owner is a large institution that holds in its portfolio a
broad cross section of the economy, holds its shares for the long term, and does
not trade except to maintain its index”. Hawley and Williams hypothesise that
universal owners could assume the role of social planners, if some positive or
negative external eﬀects between proﬁts of diﬀerent ﬁrms exist. For example,
if ﬁrm A hampers proﬁts of ﬁrm B through the use of polluting technologies,
14it could be very well in the interest of pension funds for ﬁrm A to switch to
a clean production technology, even if the value of ﬁrm A is lower after the
switch. Under the following condition, such a switch could be sensible from the
viewpoint of a pension fund:
αBVB(XB) − αAVA(XA) ≥ 0 (13)
where XB > 0 is the percentage gain of capitalised proﬁts of ﬁrm B due
to Firm A changing to a cleaner technology, and XA < 0 is the capitalised
reduction of proﬁts of Firm A after the switch. We abstract here from changes
in weights of the portfolio of the pension fund.
Pension funds, if they want to pursue this strategy, had best “coerce” heavily
polluting ﬁrms into switching to a clean technology. But there are several
caveats: 1. Only in rare cases (for example chemical ﬁrms polluting rivers and
thereby hampering the ﬁshing industry) can such direct negative externalities
be proven and the direct economic impact measured. 2. The connection is
not that clear cut, pension funds, especially if they operate in a coordinated
matter, have to share homogenous beliefs about which industries are harmful
to others. Monitoring activity in this regard would therefor also include an
environmental dimension. From a corporate governance viewpoint, it is not
clear if management of ﬁrm A should give in when approached by a pension
fund asking to switch to a clean technology. By doing so it would impair
the interest of shareholders, who held only stocks of ﬁrm A but none of B.
Additionally, if these steps toward a cleaner technology could be undertaken
continuously, management would face a dilemma: How should the conﬂicting
goals of proﬁt maximisation and reduction of pollution be weighted? In this
respect, it has to be noted, that Tirole (2000) mentions a clear lack of mission
as one of three problems for the implementation of the stakeholder society.
4 Concluding Comments
It has been shown that the formation of a coalition of pension funds for mon-
itoring purposes is costly, which induces the incentive to free ride. The higher
the incentive to free ride, which is more likely to be the case when ownership
is more dispersed, the less likely the probability of the formation of a coalition.
Whether or not active monitoring is encouraged by the public or the reg-
ulator, disclosures of stock holdings within the group of pension funds should
at least be promoted. From the viewpoint of society, pension funds should be
allowed to endorse shareholder resolutions originated by pension funds, which
force ﬁrms to move towards a clean technology. Existing regulations which
prohibit coordinated behaviour should be lifted for pension funds.
Pension funds, like other institutional investors, have gained considerable
weight in stock markets in the last decades. With economic growth and im-
proved regulations stock markets have become more liquid and therefore own-
ership has become more dispersed. In the absence of a market for corporate
15control and in light of the principal-agent problem it can be dangerous for soci-
ety, if all pension funds due to risk considerations only invest in a passive way.
Also for a single pension fund such a strategy could be disadvantageous. We
argue in our paper that active coordinated monitoring by pension funds can be
value-enhancing. Additionally, pension funds as stockholders could also take
on an active coordinated role, in order to force ﬁrms to implement newer and
cleaner technology. A necessary condition for that to happen is that pension
funds are able to coordinate their actions and are able to ﬁnd a way to divide
the monitoring costs. If pension funds adopt such goals and strategies, corpo-
rate governance can be understood as “the design of institutions that induce or
force management to internalize the welfare of stakeholders” (Tirole, 2001, p.4).




Suppose the random variable T has a continuous probability distribution f(t),




f(s)ds = Prob(T 6 t). (14)
The probability that the spell is of length at least t is given by the survival
function
S(t) = 1 − F(t) = Prob(T > t). (15)
The hazard rate answers the following question. Given that the the spell has















→ The hazard rate is the rate at which spells are completed after duration t,
given that they lasted until time t.
Binomial Distribution
The probability of observing up to M successes in N independent Bernoulli-
trials is given by







Pn(1 − P)N−n. (17)
The probability of observing more than M successes in N independent Bernoulli-
trials is given by
1 − B(M|N,P). (18)














→ The hazard rate of the binomial distribution answers the question, how big
is the variation of the probability that there won’t be more than M successes
in N independent Benoulli-trials after an inﬁnitesimal small increase in the
probability of success in one trial, P, given that the probability of drawing
more than M for ﬁxed P and N is 1 − B(M|N,P).
5.2 Solution Algorithm
1. Deﬁne a vector i with nk elements, with nk not smaller than 100.
2. Span up a vector of probabilities P = {P{i=1} = 0,...,P{i=nk} = 1}.






4. 1 − b PM
n=0
N!
n!(N−n)!P n(1−P)N−n is declining in P. Find that P{i} for which
x{i} < C
V M and set i = max and i − 1 = min.
5. Deﬁne a new vector with
P{max}−P{min}
nk−1 entries from P{min,i=1} to P{max,i=nk}.
6. Go back to Step 3 until C
V M − x{max} < tol, with tol = 1 10−j and j ≥ 9.
185.3 MatLab- solution routine











   x=1-factorial(N)/(factorial(M)*factorial(N-M))*P(i)^M*(1-P(i))^(N-M)/(binocdf(M,N,P
(i)))
   %x = 1 - binopdf(M,N,P(i))/(binocdf(M,N,P(i)))
   if (x<=C) 
       P(i)
       max=i
       i=nk+1
   else
       i=i+1











   x=1-factorial(N)/(factorial(M)*factorial(N-M))*P(i)^M*(1-P(i))^(N-M)/(binocdf(M,N,P
(i)))
    %x = 1 - binopdf(M,N,P(i))/(binocdf(M,N,P(i)))
   if (x<=C) 
       max=i
       i=nk
   else
       i=i
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